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that the stipulated penalties imposed under the Decree were
reasonable because the penalties directly related to the environmental
harm caused by A&A, and the amount assessed was less than 10
percent of the statutory authorized penalty.
The court addressed A&A's second argument, noting that,
although the Decree provided for the extension of deadlines in the
event of a Force Majeure, the provision required A&A to notify the
EPA in writing if it intended to invoke the provision. Therefore,
because A&A did not comply with the Decree's procedural
requirements, it could not claim impossibility. Moreover, because the
flood occurred seven months after the Decree's deadline, the court
reasoned that the flooding did not warrant an excuse for the delay
and, therefore was irrelevant. Thus, the court affirmed the district
court's judgment.
ChristopherA. Gfnffin
United States v. Chemetco, Inc., 274 F.3d 1154 (7th Cir. 2001)
(holding: (1) section 309(c) (2) of the Clean Water Act ("CWA") was
unambiguous; (2) Congress intended the number of violation days to
be a sentencing factor and not an element of a CWA offense; and (3)
the fine imposed by the district court did not exceed the prescribed
statutory maximum penalty).
Chemetco plead guilty to violating section 301 of the CWA. The
district court ordered Chemetco to pay a fine based on the number of
days it violated the CWA. Chemetco appealed its sentence, arguing
that the district court misinterpreted the CWA and that the court's
findings violated the rule set forth in Apprendi v. New Jersey.
Chemetco obtained a permit from the Illinois Environmental
Protection Agency ("EPA") allowing construction and operation of a
storm-water runoff control system. Chemetco also installed, without a
permit, a secret pipe running from its property to a ditch tributary.
For a period of ten years, Chemetco used the secret pipe to illegally
release water containing toxic metals, until United States and Illinois
EPA agents discovered it.
Chemetco was indicted for conspiring to violate the CWA and
knowingly violating section 301 of the CWA. After conducting an
investigation, the government recommended fining Chemetco for 949
days of violation. According to its calculations, Chemecto argued it
was only liable for 71 days of violation. Chemetco also objected to the
government's findings, citing the Supreme Court's recent decision in
Apprendi. Chemetco further claimed that the government had to
prove the number of days of violation beyond a reasonable doubt, and
it had to be charged in the indictment with each day of violation.
The district court found that the indictment was sufficient because
it informed Chemetco of the charges and put it on notice of the
potential maximum penalty. Further, the district court found that

Issue 2

COURT REPORTS

Apprendi did not apply; therefore, the number of days of violation
under the CWA was a sentencing factor the court could find by a
preponderance of the evidence. Accordingly, the district court found
there were 676 days of violation and sentenced Chemetco to a fine of
$33,275,000. Chemetco appealed that sentence.
The issue in this case was whether the number of days Chemetco
violated the CWA is an element of a CWA offense or a sentencing
factor. Due process requires the government to prove each element of
an offense beyond a reasonable doubt. After the government has met
this burden and an offender is found guilty of a crime, however, courts
can apply sentencing factors based on a preponderance of the
evidence to increase the offender's punishment. The court of appeals
held that it was important to determine whether the number of days
Chemetco violated the CWA was an element of a crime or a sentencing
factor. If the number of violation days belonged in the former
category, then it was reversible error for the district court to calculate
the number of violation days based on a preponderance of the
evidence.
The Supreme Court has ruled that, within certain constitutional
limits, Congress can identify which factors are elements of a crime and
which are sentencing factors. Therefore, the court of appeals had to
first determine Congress' intent. The court determined that if the
number of days of violation was a sentencing factor, then the next
inquiry became whether such a determination comported with the
constitutional limits elucidated in Apprendi.
To determine whether Congress intended the number of violation
days to be a sentencing factor or an element of a crime, the court of
appeals considered the language of the statute. When the language of
a statute is clear and unambiguous, courts must give effect to its plain
meaning unless doing so would "thwart the purpose of the overall
statutory scheme."
The court of appeals concluded that the language of section
309(c) (2) was unambiguous. Thus, the court held it had to give effect
to the statute unless doing so was inconsistent with the overall statutory
scheme of the CWA. The court found CWA's statutory scheme was
clear, as section 301 and other sections define what constitutes a
violation and section 309 establishes penalties for these violations.
Thus, because the clear and unambiguous language of section
309(c) (2) comported with the overall statutory scheme of the CWA,
the court concluded Congress intended the number of violation days
to be a sentencing factor and not an element of a CWA offense.
Moreover, the court of appeals held the plain language of the
CWA contradicted Chemetco's argument that each day of violation was
a separate offense. Section 309(c) (2) allows district courts to impose
fines "per day of violation," thereby implying that violations may span
more than one day. Given that generally a court should not construe a
statute in a way that makes words or phrases meaningless or
superfluous, the court found Chemetco's argument unavailing.
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Chemetco further argued that its sentence violated the rule
announced by the Supreme Court in Apprendi. In that case, the
Supreme Court held any fact that increased the penalty for a crime
beyond the prescribed statutory maximum had to be proven beyond a
reasonable doubt. Chemetco claimed the CWA had a statutory
maximum penalty: $50,000 per day of violation. The court held that
even if Chemetco's argument was taken as true, it would not mandate
a reversal because an Apprendi violation only occurred when the
imposed sentence exceeded the prescribed statutory maximum.
Chemetco had urged the district court to find seventy-one days of
violation, which would yield a fine range of $342,500 to $3,425,000.
The court's fine of $3,327,500 was less than what Chemetco contended
was appropriate. The court of appeals concluded, therefore, even if
the CWA had a statutory maximum penalty, the district court's fine did
not exceed the limit ($3,425,000) in the present case. Accordingly,
the court of appeals affirmed Chemetco's sentence.
GloriaM. Soto

NINTH CIRCUIT
Sierra Club v. Whitman, 268 F.3d 898, (9th Cir. 2001) (holding
Environmental Protection Agency's refusal to take action against
alleged violations of the Clean Water Act was discretionary and not
subject to judicial review).
The Sierra Club and an individual citizen (collectively "Sierra
Club") sued the Administrator of the Environmental Protection
Agency ("EPA"), Christine Todd Whitman ("Whitman"), and others
for failing to take action against the operators of a wastewater
treatment plant allegedly polluting the Santa Cruz River in violation of
the Clean Water Act ("CWA"). The CWA authorizes any citizen to sue
the Administrator of the EPA for failure to perform any act or duty
deemed "not discretionary" under the act.
The treatment plant ("Plant"), located in Southern Arizona, served
a relatively small population of Americans and Mexicans, and had a
National Pollution Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES") permit
that expired in 1996. The Plant continued to operate and discharge
pollutants thereafter while a new NPDES permit was on appeal.
According to the lower court's findings from January 1995 to 2000, the
facility violated its permit limitations 128 times.
The Sierra Club based its suit on the theory that the CWA required
Whitman to find a violation and file suit against the Plant. It focused
on language in the CWA that provides, whenever "the Administrator
finds that any person is in violation" of permit conditions, the
Administrator "shall issue an order requiring such person to comply...
or... shall bring a civil action." The court pointed out the language

